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Introduction
Australian industrial relations was a curious beast for much of the twentieth 
century. For many it was the institutional equivalent of a marsupial — native to 
the Australian environment. It developed in the economic and social circum-
stances of the nineteenth century. Indeed the development and elaboration of 
the arbitral model of Australian industrial relations was one of the major social 
experiments of a vibrant, young and successful Australia.
It was at the high point of centralised wage fixation and trade union influ-
ence in the 1980s that the arbitral model finally faltered. In the success of the 
Accords and the transformation of the Australian economy in this period lay 
the beginning of its end. The destruction of this arbitral model took its first leg-
islative form in the Keating government’s Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993. 
From that time, Australia has been in the throes of reshaping its industrial rela-
tions to meet the new economic and social circumstances that the final decade 
of the twentieth century ushered in.
In policy terms, the martingale — the point at which policy may diverge 
from its previous path — occurred in 1993 with the Industrial Relations Reform 
Act. The major legislative changes the Howard government introduced in the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 took advantage of the shift to a bargaining model 
enshrined in the Keating government’s legislation to make subtle changes that 
would have had far-reaching consequences. Yet, before Australia could experi-
ence fully those effects, the unusual circumstances of an election in 2004 gave 
the Howard government control of the Senate as well as the House of Repre-
sentatives. These circumstances led to a legislative change that has reopened 
the whole industrial relations system for review.
The industrial relations regime introduced in the Industrial Relations Re-
form Act had its roots in a notion of liberal collectivism. In contrast, the chang-
es made in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 were in fact the Trojan horse for 
the development of a much more market individualist system. Nonetheless, 
these changes were sufficiently masked by the usual slow-unfolding impact of 
legislative change and by the continuing operation of state industrial relations 
systems, particularly in NSW and Queensland. As a result, the diminution of 
collective representation and influence looked like a societal change not a leg-
islatively-induced one.
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However, the Workplace Relations Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 
nailed its colours to the mast. WorkChoices, in concert with the interpretation 
of the Constitutional powers that gave the Howard government the opportu-
nity to effectively remove state jurisdictional coverage, made the new system 
truly national not federal. It clearly instituted a market individualist system 
and in doing so provided the opportunity for the union movement to reveal 
to workers the consequences of this new industrial relations. Reinstitution and 
reinforcement of the asymmetric power of the employer was now visible and 
pervasive. WorkChoices rejected liberal collectivism and did so through com-
plex and coercive national legislation.
The voters replied in kind, repudiating that legislation in 2007 as compre-
hensively as they had repudiated the Industrial Peace Act when Prime Minis-
ter Stanley Bruce lost his seat in 1929. As a result, in 2008 the possibility of 
deliberate institutional change is now before us. Moreover there is room for 
real choice in the industrial relations system that we create through legislation. 
This is a ‘Higgins moment’ when we can lay down the base of a system that 
should serve for many decades.
In this paper I want to consider what the possible choices are, including the 
constraints or circumstances that should be considered in making this choice. 
How should Australia set its new course for this twenty-first century?
From Arbitration to Collective Bargaining
It is important to put this reflection in context, since what we have witnessed 
in Australia in the years at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century is a strange mirror of the debates a century earlier. In that 
Higgins moment that ushered in the twentieth century, Australia famously cre-
ated a ‘new province for law and order’ (Higgins 1922), a new way of recognis-
ing and ordering relations between employees and employers.
The Antipodean form of industrial relations created an arbitral model with 
the following features:
a tribunal or tribunal system which is able to take hold of disputes between • 
employers and employees without their consent and to resolve disputes 
and in doing so make principles for decisions;
a restriction or prohibition on direct action to regulate the behaviour of the • 
parties (and incidentally moderate their market power);
decisions or awards that were binding on the parties and legally enforce-• 
able; and
a mechanism for recognising the organisations or unions of workers and • 
allowing them to represent the class of workers they organised (Mitchell 
1980: 90–1; Gardner and Palmer 1997: 17).
The operation of this arbitral model changed over time as economic and social 
circumstances varied. The importance of the tribunals was typically counter-
cyclical; that is, of less importance in a boom than in a bust. Over the first 
decades of the twentieth century, as with any regulatory forum, the limits of the 
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legislation were tested and the operating styles and models of the tribunals and 
the relationship of the parties to them elaborated and stabilised.
The study of these relationships and their outcomes did not really grow un-
til the 1950s when the significance of the way industrial relations was regulated 
became a source of academic interest in Australia, among other nations. When 
I began studying industrial relations, we had the benefit of those early investiga-
tions and the first strong current of the debate about whether Australia should 
move closer to the collective bargaining systems evident in the USA and UK 
and away from its peculiar institutional environment.
Arguments about collective bargaining versus arbitration, led by academ-
ics such as Joe Isaac (1979), Keith Hancock (1987) and John Niland (1978), 
underpinned much of my initial study of industrial relations. Essentially these 
arguments were about whether the arbitral model was flexible enough to deal 
with varying economic circumstances, nationally and at industry and enter-
prise levels. The first major policy outcomes that responded, albeit in different 
ways, to these debates emerged in the 1980s in the Hancock Report in 1984 
at federal level, and in various state government inquiries, such as the Niland 
Green Paper in 1989 in NSW.
Although the recommendations of Hancock and Niland were quite differ-
ent in kind, the outcomes led to ‘modernisation’ of the arbitral systems, rather 
than major change to the underlying features outlined above. What had been 
established in this debate, however, was the importance of providing mecha-
nisms for responding to the needs and negotiations of the parties.
Over time, too, the federal system became more dominant. The emer-
gence of national Accords between the union movement and the federal gov-
ernment in the 1980s brought a greater national focus to industrial relations. 
In the years following, this national focus was bolstered by a widening inter-
pretation of constitutional powers that provided the basis for an increasingly 
dominant federal system.
A Policy Martingale
In the mid-1990s, two pieces of federal legislation changed fundamentally the 
arbitral model, which had underpinned industrial relations through the twen-
tieth century. In 1993 the Industrial Relations Reform Act brought to the centre 
of the federal system a workplace-based bargaining regime.
The four major features of the 1993 changes were to:
make enterprise agreements the centrepiece of the system, rather than na-• 
tional wage policy translated through industry and occupational awards;
introduce an individual rights base in the legislation protecting a number • 
of minimum conditions, where previously, conditions were embedded in 
awards;
recast the tribunal’s role as arbiter of the ‘safety net’ or minimum condi-• 
tions and facilitator of bargaining, rather than regulator; and
provide a new stream of agreements that could be made with limited union • 
involvement.
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This legislation also provided a series of protections for union action and for 
individual employees. At the time of the introduction of this legislation, it was 
seen as a necessary set of changes to match a more open and flexible econo-
my, to strengthen workplace-based representation by unions, and to provide a 
stronger national platform for protection of low-paid workers through setting 
minimum conditions in legislation.
However before the effects of these changes could be felt, this legislation 
gave way to the Workplace Relations Act. This law took the main pillars of this 
new workplace-based regime and introduced stronger individualist and non-
union elements.
The major changes were to:
reduce the scope and impact of awards by specifying a limited number of • 
‘allowable’ matters. This had the effect of making enterprise agreements the 
dominant element; and
change and reduce the role of unions and the tribunal by reducing protec-• 
tions for union organisation and action, and developing a separate non-
union stream of agreements at individual and enterprise level.
The arbitral model was a justice system, which set in place, through its tribunals 
and their decisions, a web of regulation (Strauss 1990; Gardner and Palmer 
1997). It was a system in which unions had a role, through the tribunals and 
their awards and other decisions, in representing whole classes or groups of 
workers whether or not they were members.
The new regime of the 1990s changed decisively the role of tribunals and 
unions. Unions became representative only of their members and their ability 
to take action was reduced (Stewart 1992). The tribunals were given a limited 
role in facilitating agreements and making decisions in relation to individual 
rights. Legislative rights and conditions became the minima that once were 
set in awards of the Commission. And, agreements negotiated at enterprise or 
workplace level became the centre of the new industrial relations system.
Collective bargaining had arrived and displaced arbitration.
WorkChoices
When the Howard government won the 2004 election, its control of the Sen-
ate as well as the House of Representatives, allowed the introduction of new 
industrial relations legislation untouched by the need to accommodate amend-
ments, such as those imposed in 1996. The Workplace Relations Amendment 
(WorkChoices) Act 2005 — WorkChoices — took the now-established collective 
bargaining regime that was still working its way through the system and moved 
it decisively towards a more individualist and voluntarist system.
Some of the changes worked through the legal and economic trends estab-
lished in the 1990s. Specifically, the formation of a dominant national system, 
rather than a federal system, through the use of the corporations power in the 
Constitution, has now established the federal government as the decisive au-
thority for setting the industrial relations framework.
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Other changes reduced or eliminated protections of minimum conditions 
in place since the 1990s. Specifically, there was a reduction in the number of 
allowable matters that could be included in awards, and the specification of a 
very minimal set of five workplace conditions. These changes left almost no 
protection for vulnerable workers. Added to this were the major changes in 
unfair dismissal provisions that exempted companies with fewer than 100 em-
ployees and allowed dismissal of any employee for reasons that included ‘bona 
fide operational reasons’.
The role of the Commission was vestigial; the role of setting a national 
minimum wage was allocated to a new body, the Australian Fair Pay Commis-
sion, and a plethora of new bodies, such as the Workplace Authority and the 
Workplace Ombudsman, came into being to administer different parts of the 
agreement-making process. Unions, now identified only as agents representing 
their members, had less room for action and faced a range of increased restric-
tions on their activities and industrial action. The enterprise and the individual 
were enshrined as the only levels at which agreements could be made.
WorkChoices, under the guise of choice and flexibility, reinforced the asym-
metric power of the employer over employees. Those workers most vulnerable, 
typically unorganised and unrepresented by unions, had limited recourse and 
a minimal safety net. This was a system that rewarded market power, except if 
it was exercised through the collective organisations of workers. The legisla-
tion restricted a union with market power from exercising this power through 
building bargains across more than one employer or using its industrial might 
to secure better conditions for its members.
Thus, a century later, the Australian industrial relations system had been 
comprehensively reshaped and the principles and features that had shaped the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 had been overturned. The only feature 
they shared was the restrictions on direct action. However the removal of this 
collective market power from workers was not significantly redressed by re-
course to the means to resolve disputes or to provide redress to employer power 
much beyond what might be decided by the courts.
Reflections on Reviewing Industrial Relations
Before turning to what might be needed for Australian industrial relations in 
the future, I want to reflect briefly on some lessons I have drawn from a previ-
ous review of industrial relations legislation.
In 1998, I was appointed by the Queensland State government to chair a re-
view of industrial relations legislation. The newly elected Beattie Labor govern-
ment had committed itself to a review of its state legislation, which at that time 
mirrored the federal Workplace Relations Act. The Review’s terms of reference 
asked for legislation that would balance the needs of the economy with fairness 
and equity, and balance collective and individual rights.
The legislation that became the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), accepted 
the premise established in the 1990s that negotiation of agreements by employ-
ers and unions or employees, rather than variation of awards through a tribunal, 
was at the core of industrial relations. Although bargaining arrangements were 
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its centre, it retained a clear role for the arbitral tribunal in updating minimum 
conditions and resolving disputes where negotiations had broken down and for 
arbitration as a last resort.
It varied from federal legislation in providing for a wider range of collective 
agreements beyond enterprise level to deal with the circumstances that pertain 
in multi-employer projects and the like. The legislation also extended to pro-
vide for atypical workers, such as contractors and outworkers.
The Queensland legislation is in broad form closer to the framework of 
Keating’s 1993 Reform Act than the successor federal legislation. It provided 
for: flexibility through the choice of agreements; protection of the vulnerable 
through a set of minimum conditions and recognising the range of atypical 
working arrangements that had arisen; and minimisation of lengthy indus-
trial action through recourse to mediation and finally arbitration. And, unions 
retained a legitimate role in representation of, and negotiation on behalf of, 
workers.
The recommendations that formed the basis of the Queensland legisla-
tion were the result of agreement by representatives of employers, unions and 
government. As government has remained with the Labor Party, the legisla-
tion has remained in place since 1999 — with the only perturbation being the 
WorkChoices legislation, which effectively displaced a significant portion of 
state coverage.
The Queensland review responded to the changed economic and social 
circumstances of the late twentieth century and it represented the bipartisan 
political consensus that had emerged about the importance of bargaining over 
arbitration as the primary mechanism for managing relations between employ-
ers and employees.
There are three features of changed economic and social circumstances that 
remain cogent for this latest federal legislative review. They are the increasing 
scope of atypical employment arrangements in the workforce. Related to this, 
there are the increasing numbers of workers who are in circumstances where 
their employment arrangements are effectively individual. They are not repre-
sented by or not able to be reached by unions. Finally, there is a need for indus-
trial arrangements that can reflect and adjust to the circumstances of different 
industries and enterprises.
It is not clear whether there is any room for greater political consensus about 
the role for unions as representatives of workers, about the range of minimum 
conditions (and their adjustment) that should be in place for all workers, and 
about a third party mediation and arbitration role to resolve major disputes. In 
the last decade or so, these three matters have been at the core of an ideological 
battle not only about industrial relations, but about what role there is for indus-
trial relations legislation to ameliorate of the asymmetric power the employer 
holds in the employment relationship.
Negotiating This Moment
A new Labor Federal government has signalled that Australia’s industrial rela-
tions system will change again. The Workplace Relations Amendment (Transi-
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tion to Forward with Fairness) Bill 2008 was introduced into the Australian 
Parliament on 13 February 2008, passed on 19 March 2008 and became effec-
tive on 27 March.
The key amendments in this Act remove the individual workplace agree-
ments (AWAs) (subject to some transitional arrangements), introduce a no-
disadvantage test that will provide a floor of conditions under new agree-
ments, and allow the Commission back into the regulatory arena via award 
modernisation.
In this Transition Act, we see some of the initial directions of the future 
Australian industrial relations system. These provisions take us back to the leg-
islation of the 1990s. In this change, we will see one further matter revealed 
and that is whether there remains a lack of bipartisan consensus on Australia’s 
industrial relations system.
First, it is important that a stronger bipartisan consensus is formed. It is now 
clear on the basis of current constitutional interpretation that there is, in effect, 
only one industrial relations system in Australia and it is national. Without the 
checks and balances of a federal system, it is important that the regulation of 
employers and employees is not subject to whimsical change on the basis of the 
ideological predisposition of the party in power.
Second, the new legislation should therefore build on the current areas of 
agreement in the way of any good negotiation — beginning with ‘yes’ before as-
saying the ‘nos’. To this end, I want to briefly outline the range of areas on which 
there is agreement. In the category of agreed foundations is that bargaining is 
central, that there is a need to specify minimum conditions to underpin the 
arrangements of all workers and particularly the vulnerable, and that unions 
are able to represent workers who are their members. There is also clear un-
derstanding that an independent body is needed to check that the legislation is 
complied with, that disputes over rights under the legislation can be dealt with, 
and that industrial action should be regulated.
There are matters to be resolved in each of these areas and in most we need 
broader debate than has been evident in the last decade or so. In attempting 
to provide flexibility in bargaining and moving away from industry or sector-
wide awards, the enterprise became the focus. There is, however, no reason that 
the enterprise should be the focus for all bargaining. The rise of atypical em-
ployment, the fragmentation of some industries and consolidation of others, all 
would argue for recognising that, in some cases, multiple employers may wish 
to bargain together and, in others, individual enterprises. We should seek in the 
new legislation to recognise a range of bargaining arrangements.
The range of minimum conditions must be specified and a mechanism 
for their adjustment put in place that is at arm’s length from government. The 
range of minima will be subject to debate between employers and unions, but 
there is, I would argue, a clear and accepted set generally in operation that goes 
beyond the minimum conditions specified in WorkChoices. In order to adjust 
these over time, there is a need to be at one remove from government and that 
requires an independent tribunal.
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If unions can and should represent their members, then there must be ar-
rangements that allow them to gain access to potential new members and to 
their existing members in order to understand their aspirations and grievances. 
Unnecessary restrictions in these areas amount to practical repudiation of free-
dom of association.
There are a range of regulatory and compliance requirements. There is a 
need to adjust minimum conditions and pay, to check that legislative require-
ments for bargaining and agreements have been complied with and can be en-
forced and that breaches of the legislation are addressed. From the 1996 legis-
lation through to WorkChoices, we have seen the proliferation of agencies to 
undertake these functions and a tendency to focus enforcement of rights and 
breaches of them on the courts.
There seems little reason to have so many agencies, alongside an independ-
ent tribunal that has had many decades’ experience in dealing with adjustments 
to minimum wages and conditions, monitoring agreements and addressing 
compliance with industrial relations legislation. When mediation is the pre-
ferred method to deal with many commercial and private disputes, it appears 
unusual to step away from this method in the industrial relations arena.
The shift to bargaining as the core of the Australian industrial relations sys-
tem means that there will be no return to the arbitral model as it developed in 
the last century. However, there is an argument for drawing on the experience 
of the Commission in taking an administrative role in adjusting minimum 
wages and conditions and in its accommodative role in resolving disputes as 
a last resort.
As we enshrine a stronger rights-based approach to employment arrange-
ments, we would do well to use previous Australian experience to keep indus-
trial relations as much as possible out of the courts and in the realm of prag-
matic tribunal resolutions and determinations.
Conclusion
We face a moment in Australian industrial relations when we can negotiate an 
outcome that draws on our history but can respond flexibly to the future. We 
should aim for a framework that reconciles the demands of an open economy 
with a regard for social justice and fairness; that balances the rights of the in-
dividual and the collective; and has room for an independent forum to assist 
where negotiations break down or legislative requirements are breached.
There is no going back to the arbitral model. There is no way we can rely on 
collective agreements to address the multitude of employment arrangements 
we now confront. And so, to secure that fairness and social justice that should 
underpin our employment arrangements, and encourage employers to inno-
vate and improve, we must rely on legislation that enshrines minimum condi-
tions and rights.
No system where interests collide can proceed without a means to break 
deadlocks in negotiations or redress major asymmetry of market power. Here 
an independent tribunal has form and reason and there is a need to ensure 
that the ability of workers to organise collectively and have effective representa-
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tion is protected. Once these foundational matters seemed straightforward in 
Australian industrial relations. Only in the last decade have we had to reassert 
their importance. This is the moment to negotiate a new settlement for indus-
trial relations — affirming that we have found our way to a liberal collectivist 
industrial relations regime.
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